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Abstract. In this work we initiate the question of whether quantum computers
can provide us with an almost perfect source of classical randomness, and more
generally, suffice for classical cryptographic tasks, such as encryption. Indeed,
it was observed [SV86,MP91,DOPS04] that classical computers are insufficient
for either one of these tasks when all they have access to is a realistic imperfect
source of randomness, such as the Santha-Vazirani source.
We answer this question in the negative, even in the following very restrictive
model. We generously assume that quantum computation is error-free, and all
the errors come in the measurements. We further assume that all the measurement
errors are not only small but also detectable: namely, all that can happen is that
with a small probability p⊥ ≤ δ the (perfectly performed) measurement will
result in some distinguished symbol ⊥ (indicating an “erasure”). Specifically, we
assume that if an element x was supposed to be observed with probability px, in
reality it might be observed with probability p′x ∈ [(1−δ)px, px], for some small
δ > 0 (so that p⊥ = 1−
P
x
p′x ≤ δ).
Our negative “quantum” result also implies a new “classical” result of indepen-
dent interest: namely, even a much more restrictive form of (classical) Santha-
Vazirani sources is not sufficient for randomness extraction and cryptography.
1 Introduction
Randomness is important in many areas of computer science, such as algorithms, cryp-
tography and distributed computing. A common abstraction typically used in these ap-
plications is that there exists some source of unbiased and independent random bits.
However, in practise this assumption seems to be problematic: although there seem
to be many ways to obtain somewhat random data, this data is almost never uniformly
random, its exact distribution is unknown, and, correspondingly, various algorithms and
protocols have to be based on imperfect sources of randomness.
Not surprisingly, a large body of work (see below) has attempted to bridge the gap
between this convenient theoretical abstraction and the actual reality. So far, however,
most of this work concentrated on studying if classical computers can effectively use
classical imperfect sources of randomness. In this work, we initiate the corresponding
study regarding quantum computation. To motivate our question, we start by surveying
the state of the art in using classical computers, which will demonstrate that such com-
puters are provably incapable of tolerating even “mildly” imperfect random sources.
CLASSICAL APPROACH TO IMPERFECT RANDOMNESS. The most straightfor-
ward approach to dealing with an imperfect random source is to deterministi-
cally (and efficiently) extract nearly-perfect randomness from it. Indeed, many
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such results were obtained for several classes of imperfect random sources.
They include various “streaming” sources [Neu51,Eli72,Blu86,LLS89], “bit-fixing”
sources [CGH+85,BBR88,AL93,CDH+00,DSS01,KZ03], multiple independent im-
perfect sources [SV86,Vaz87a,Vaz87b,CG88,DO03,DEOR04,BIW04] and efficiently
samplable sources [TV00]. While these results are interesting and non-trivial, the above
“deterministically extractable” sources assume a lot of structure or independence in the
way they generate randomness. A less restrictive, and arguably more realistic, assump-
tion on the random source would be to assume only that the source contains some en-
tropy. We call such sources entropy sources. Entropy sources were first introduced by
Santha and Vazirani [SV86], and later generalised by Chor and Goldreich [CG88], and
Zuckerman [Zuc96].
The entropy sources of Santha and Vazirani [SV86] are the least imperfect (which
means it is the hardest to show impossibility results for such sources) among the en-
tropy sources considered so far (e.g., as compared to [CG88,Zuc96]). SV sources, as
they are called, require every bit output by the source to have almost one bit of entropy,
even when conditioned on all the previous bits. Unfortunately, already the original work
of [SV86] (see also a simpler proof in [RVW04]) showed that deterministic random-
ness extraction of even a single bit is not possible from all SV sources. This can also
be considered as impossibility of pseudo-random generators with access to only an SV
source. Moreover, this result was later extended by McInnes and Pinkas [MP91], who
showed that in the classical setting of computationally unlimited adversaries, one cannot
have secure symmetric encryption if the shared key comes from an SV source. Finally
and most generally, Dodis et al. [DOPS04] showed that SV sources in fact cannot be
used essentially for any interesting classical cryptographic task involving privacy (such
as encryption, commitment, zero-knowledge, multiparty computation), even when re-
stricting to computationally bounded adversaries. Thus, even for the currently most re-
strictive entropy sources, classical computation does not seem to suffice for applications
inherently requiring randomness (such as extraction and cryptography).3
We also mention that the impossibility results no longer hold when the extracting
party has a small amount of true randomness (this is the study of so called probabilistic
randomness extractors [NZ96]), or if several independent entropy sources are available
[SV86,Vaz87a,Vaz87b,CG88,DO03,DEOR04,BIW04]
QUANTUM COMPUTERS? Given the apparent inadequacy of classical computers to
deal with entropy sources — at least for certain important tasks such as cryptography
—, it is natural to ask if quantum computers can be of help. More specifically, given
that quantum computation is inherently probabilistic, can we use quantum computers
to generate nearly perfect randomness? (Or maybe just “good enough” randomness
for cryptographic tasks like encryption, which, as we know [DS02], do not require
perfect randomness?) For example, to generate a perfectly random bit from a fixed
qubit |0〉, one can simply apply the Hadamard transform, and then measure the result
3 In contrast, a series of celebrated positive results [VV85,SV86,CG88,Zuc96] show that even
very weak entropy sources are enough for simulating probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms
— namely, the task which does not inherently need randomness. This result was extended to
interactive protocols by [DOPS04]. [DOPS04] also show that under certain strong, but reason-
able computational assumptions, secure signatures seem to be possible with entropy sources.
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in the standard basis. Unfortunately, what prevents this simple solution from working
in practise is the fact that it is virtually impossible to perform the above transformation
(in particular, the measurement) precisely, so the resulting bit is likely to be slightly
biased. In other words, we must deal with the noise. More generally, noise is a very
serious issue in quantum computation, which means that certain error-correction and
fault-tolerance must be applied in order to overcome such noise. Indeed, fault-tolerance
is one of the major problems in quantum computing (see [NC00]), so we will have to
address it as well. Jumping ahead, however, what will differentiate us from all the prior
work in the area is the fact that we do not assume largely independent noise (which can
be dealt with by quantum error-correction).
But, first, let us explain why there are good reasons to hope for quantum comput-
ers to be useful despite the noise. When dealing with classical imperfect sources, we
usually assume that the source comes from some family of distributions “outside of
our control” (e.g., “nature”), so we would like to make as few assumptions about these
distributions as we can. For example, this is why the study of imperfect randomness
quickly converged to entropy sources as being the most plausible sources one could get
from nature. In contrast, by using a quantum computer to generate our random source
for us, we are proactively designing a source of randomness which is convenient for
use, rather than passively hoping that nature will give us such a source. Indeed, if not
for the noise, it would be trivial to generate ideal randomness in our setting. Moreover,
even with noise we have a lot of freedom in adapting our quantum computer to generate
and measure quantum states of our choice, depending on the computation so far.
OUR MODEL. We first define a natural model for using a (realistically noisy) quantum
computer for the task of randomness extraction (or, more generally, any probabilistic
computation, such as the one needed in classical cryptography). As we will see shortly,
we will prove a negative result in our model, despite the optimism we expressed in the
previous paragraph. Because of this, we will make the noise as small and as restrictive
as we can, even if these restrictions are completely “generous” and unrealistic. Indeed,
we will assume that the actual quantum computation is error-free, and all the errors
come in the measurements (which are necessary to extract some classical result out of
the system). Of course, in reality the quantum computation will also be quite noisy,
but our assumption will not only allow us to get a stronger result, but also reduce our
“quantum” question to a natural “purely classical” question of independent interest.
Moreover, we will further assume that all the measurement errors are not only very
small, but also detectable: namely, all that can happen is that with a small probabil-
ity p⊥ ≤ δ the (perfectly performed) measurement will result in some distinguished
symbol ⊥ (indicating an “erasure”). Specifically, we assume that if an element x was
supposed to be observed with probability px, in reality it might be observed with prob-
ability p′x ∈ [(1−δ)px, px], for some small δ > 0 (so that p⊥ = 1−
∑
x p
′
x ≤ δ). Thus,
it is guaranteed that no events of small probability can be completely “removed”, and
the probability of no event can be increased. Moreover, as compared to the classical SV
model, in our model the state to be measured can be prepared arbitrarily, irrespective of
the computational complexity of preparing this state. Further, such quantum states can
even be generated adaptively and based on the measurements so far. For comparison,
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in the SV model the “ideal” measurement would always correspond to an unbiased bit;
additionally, the SV model allows for “errors” while we only allow “erasures”.
OUR RESULT. Unfortunately, our main result will show that even in this extremely
restrictive noise model, one cannot extract even a single nearly uniform bit. In other
words, if the measurement errors could be correlated, quantum computers do not help
to extract classical randomness. More generally, we extend the technique of [DOPS04]
to our model and show that one cannot generate two (classical) computationally in-
distinguishable distributions which are not nearly identical to begin with. This can be
used to show the impossibility of classical encryption, commitment, zero-knowledge
and other tasks exactly as in [DOPS04]. We notice, however, that our result does not
exclude the possibility of generating perfect entanglement, which might be used to en-
crypt a message into a quantum state. Nevertheless, our result implies that, even with
the help of such perfect entanglement, the user will not be able to generate a (shared)
classical key that can be used for cryptographic tasks. To summarise, we only rule out
the possibility of classical cryptography with quantumly generated randomness, leav-
ing open the question of (even modelling!) quantum cryptography with noise.
Of independent interest, we reduce our “quantum” problem to the study of a new
classical source, which is considerably more restrictive than the SV source (and this
restriction can really be enforced in our model). We then show a classical impossibility
result for our new source, which gives a non-trivial generalisation of the correspond-
ing impossibility result for the SV sources [DOPS04,SV86]. From another angle, it
also generalises the impossibility of extraction from the so called “bias-control limited”
(BCL) sources of [Dod01]. As with our source, the most general BCL source consid-
ered in [Dod01] can adaptively generate samples from arbitrary distributions (and not
just random bits). However, the attacker is given significantly more freedom in bias-
ing the “real” distributions. First, all expected “real” distributions can be changed to
arbitrary statistically close ones (which gives more power than performing “detectable
erasures”), and, second, a small number of “real” distributions can be changed arbitrar-
ily (which we do not allow at all).
To summarise, our main results can be viewed in three areas:
1. A model of using noisy quantum computers for classical probabilistic computation.
2. A reduction from a “quantum” question to the classical question concerning a much
more restrictive variant of the SV (or general BCL) source(s).
3. A non-trivial impossibility result for the classical source we define.
RELATION TO QUANTUM ERROR-CORRECTION. What differentiates us from the
usual model of quantum computation with noise is the fact that our errors are not as-
sumed independent. In particular, conventional results on fault-tolerant quantum com-
putation (such as the threshold theorem; see [NC00] for more details) do not apply in
our model (as is apparent from our negative results). From another perspective, our im-
possibility result is not just a trivial application of the principle that one can always and
without loss of generality postpone all the measurements until the end (a useful obser-
vation true in the “perfect measurement” case). For example, if all the measurements
are postponed to the end, then we might observe a single “useless” ⊥ symbol with non-
trivial probability δ, while with many measurements we are bound to observe a lot of
“useful” non-⊥ symbols with probability exponentially close to one.
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Nevertheless, in our model one can trivially simulate probabilistic algorithms com-
puting deterministic outputs, just as was the case for the classical computation. For
example, here we actually can postpone all the measurements until the end, and then
either obtain an error (with probability at most δ in which case the computation can be
repeated), or the desired result (with probability arbitrarily close to 1 − δ). Of course,
this “positive” result only holds because our noise model was made unrealistically re-
strictive (since we proved an impossibility result). Thus, it would be interesting to define
a less restrictive (and more realistic!) error model — for example where the actual quan-
tum computation is not error-free — and see if this feasibility result would still hold.
Finally, the problem of detection errors has been studied in the context of non-
locality testing [CH74,MSS83,Mas02], which tries to experimentally prove the intrigu-
ing phenomenon that the behaviour of certain distant but entangled particles cannot be
explained by classical randomness. These results are of the same flavor as our impossi-
bility result. Indeed, they show that, if certain detection probability is too low, then the
outputs might be chosen in a malicious way such that the resulting statistics does not
imply non-locality. To our knowledge, this is the only result where some impossibility
is proved, based on the assumption that certain errors occur.
2 Definition of the source
A source with n outputs X1, X2, . . . , Xn is specified by a joint probability distribution
PX1···Xn . However, for most realistic sources, the actual distribution PX1···Xn can usu-
ally not be fully determined. Instead, only a few characteristics of the source are known,
e.g., that the conditional probability distributions4 PXi|Xi−1 have certain properties. A
well-known example for such a characterisation are the Santha-Vazirani sources.
Definition 1 ([SV86]). A probability distribution PX1···Xn on {0, 1}n is an α-SV
source if5 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and xi−1 ∈ {0, 1}i−1 we have
PXi|Xi−1=xi−1(0) ∈ [α, 1− α]
We will define a more general class of sources which, in some sense, includes the
SV sources (cf. Appendix). The main motivation for our definition is to capture any
kind of randomness that can be generated using imperfect (quantum) physical devices.
Indeed, we will show in Section 3 that the randomness generated by any imperfect
physical device cannot be more useful than the randomness obtained from a source as
defined below.
Intuitively, a source can be seen as a device which sequentially outputs symbols
X1, . . . , Xn from some alphabet X . Each output Xi is chosen according to some fixed
probability distribution which might depend on all previous outputsX1, . . . , Xi−1. The
“imperfectness” of the source is then modelled as follows. Each output Xi is “erased”
with some probability p⊥, i.e., it is replaced by some distinguished symbol ⊥. This
4 We write Xk to denote the k-tuple (X1, . . . , Xk).
5 PXi|Xi−1=xi−1 denotes the probability distribution of Xi conditioned on the event that the
(i− 1)-tuple Xi−1 = (X1, . . . , Xi−1) takes the value xi−1 = (x1, . . . , xi−1).
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erasure probability might depend on the actual output Xi as well as on all previous
outputs X1, . . . , Xi−1, but is upper bounded by some fixed parameter δ.
Before stating the formal definition, let us introduce some notation to be used in the
sequel. For any set X , we denote by X¯ the set X¯ := X ∪ {⊥} which contains an extra
symbol ⊥. For a probability distribution PX on X and δ ≥ 0, let Pδ(PX) be the set of
probability distributions P¯X on X¯ such that
(1− δ)PX(x) ≤ P¯X(x) ≤ PX(x) ,
for all x ∈ X . In particular, the probability of the symbol ⊥ is bounded by δ, that is,
P¯X(⊥) ≤ δ.
Definition 2. Let δ ≥ 0 and let, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, QXi|Xi−1 be a channel6 from
X¯ i−1 to X . A probability distribution PX1···Xn on X¯n is a (δ, {QXi|Xi−1})-source if
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and xi−1 = (x1, . . . , xi−1) ∈ X¯ i−1 we have
PXi|Xi−1=xi−1 ∈ P
δ(QXi|Xi−1=xi−1)
In the Appendix , we show that (δ, {QXi|Xi−1})-sources can be used to simulate α-
SV sources, for some appropriately chosen α. This means that (δ, {QXi|Xi−1})-sources
are at least as useful as SV sources. The other direction is, however, not true. That
is, (δ, {QXi|Xi−1})-sources have a strictly less“malicious” behaviour than SV sources
(which makes our impossibility proofs stronger).
3 The quantum model
In this section, we propose a model that describes the extraction of classical informa-
tion from imperfect quantum physical devices. Clearly, our considerations also include
purely classical systems as a special case.
First, in Section 3.1, we review the situation where the quantum device is perfect. In
this case, the process of extracting randomness can most generally be seen as a sequence
of perfect quantum operations and perfect measurements. Then, in Section 3.2, we con-
sider the imperfect case where the quantum device is subject to (malicious) noise. As
we shall see, in order to get strong impossibility results, it is sufficient to extend the
standard notion of perfect measurements by the possibility of detectable failures in the
measurement process.
3.1 The perfect case
Let us briefly review some basic facts about quantum mechanics. The state of a quan-
tum system is specified by a projector P|ψ〉 onto a vector |ψ〉 in a Hilbert spaceH. More
generally, if a system is prepared by choosing a state from some family {|ψz〉}z∈Z ac-
cording to a probability distribution PZ on Z , then the behaviour of the system is fully
6 A channel QY |X from X to Y is a function on Y × X such that, for any x ∈ X , QY |X=x :=
QY |X(·, x) is a probability distribution on Y .
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described by the density operator ρ :=
∑
z∈Z PZ(z)P|ψz〉. The most general opera-
tion that can be applied on a quantum system is specified by a family E = {Ex}x∈X
of operators on H such that
∑
x∈X E
†
xEx = idH (see, e.g., [NC00]). When E is ap-
plied to a system which is in state ρ, then, with probability PX(x) := tr(ExρE†x),
the classical output x ∈ X is produced and the final state ρx of the system is
ρx :=
1
PX(x)
ExρE
†
x. Hence, when ignoring the classical output x, the state E(ρ)
of the system after applying the operation E is the average of the states ρx, that is,
E(ρ) :=
∑
x PX(x)ρx =
∑
x ExρE
†
x.
It is important to note that also the action of preparing a quantum system to be in a
certain state ρ0 can be described by a quantum operation E . To see this, let ρ0 be given
by ρ0 =
∑
z∈Z PZ(z)P|ψz〉, for some family of vectors {|ψz〉}z∈Z and a probability
distribution PZ on Z . Additionally, let {|i〉}i∈{1,...,d} be an orthonormal basis of H. It
is easy to verify that the quantum operation E = {Ez,i}z∈Z,i∈{1,...,d} defined by the
operators
Ez,i :=
√
PX(z)|ψz〉〈i|
maps any arbitrary state ρ to ρ0, that is, E(ρ) = ρ0.
We are now ready to describe the process of randomness extraction from a quantum
system. Consider a classical user with access to a quantum physical device. The most
general thing he can do is to subsequently apply quantum operations, where each of
these operations provides him with classical information which he might use to select
the next operation. To describe this on a formal level, let H be a Hilbert space and let
X be a set. The strategy of the user in each step i is then defined by the quantum opera-
tion Exi−1 = {Exi−1x }x∈X he applies depending on the classical outputs xi−1 ∈ X i−1
obtained in the previous steps. Note that, according to the above discussion, this de-
scription also includes the action of preparing (parts of) the quantum system in a certain
state. We can thus assume without loss of generality that the initial state of the system is
given by some fixed projector P|ψ0〉. The probability distribution PXi|Xi−1=xi−1 of the
classical outcomes in the ith step conditioned on the previous outputs xi−1 as well as
the quantum state ρxi after the ith step given the outputs xi is then recursively defined
by ρx0 := P|ψ0〉 and
PXi|Xi−1=xi−1(x) := tr(E
xi−1
x ρxi−1E
xi−1†
x ) (1)
ρxi = ρ(xi−1,x) :=
1
PXi|Xi−1=xi−1(x)
Ex
i−1
x ρxi−1E
xi−1†
x . (2)
3.2 Quantum measurements with malicious noise
We will now extend the model of the previous section to include situations where the
quantum operations are subject to noise. As we are interested in proving the impossi-
bility of certain tasks in the presence of noise, our results are stronger if we assume that
only parts of the quantum operation are noisy. In particular, we will restrict to systems
where only the classical measurements are subject to perturbations.7
7 To see that our model leads to strong impossibility results, consider for example an adversary
who is allowed to transform the quantum state ρ of the device into a state ρ′ which has at
8 Yevgeniy Dodis and Renato Renner
Formally, we define an imperfect quantum device by its behaviour when applying
any operation E . Let δ ≥ 0 and let E = {Ex,u}x∈X ,u∈U be a quantum operation which
produces two classical outcomes x and u, where x is the part of the output that is ob-
served by the user. The operation E acts on the imperfect device as it would in the
perfect case, except that each output x is, with some probability λx ≤ δ, replaced by a
symbol ⊥, indicating that something went wrong. Additionally, we assume that, when-
ever such an error occurs, the state of the system remains unchanged.8 The resulting
probability distribution PX of the outputs when applying E to an imperfect device in
state ρ is thus given by
PX(x) :=
∑
u
(1− λx) tr(Ex,uρE
†
x,u) .
In particular, the probability of the symbol ⊥ is PX(⊥) = 1−
∑
x∈X PX(x) ≤ δ.
Let us now consider the interaction of a user with such an imperfect quantum device.
In each step i, he either observes the correct outcome or he gets the output⊥, indicating
that something went wrong. The user might want to use this information to choose the
subsequent operations. His strategy is thus defined by a family {Exi−1}xi−1∈X¯ i−1 of
quantum operations Exi−1 = {Exi−1x,u }x∈X ,u∈U .9 The conditional probability distribu-
tions PXi|Xi−1=xi−1 of the observed outputs in the ith step, for xi−1 ∈ X¯ i−1, and the
states ρxi after the ith step are recursively defined, analogously to (1) and (2), by
PXi|Xi−1=xi−1(x) := (1− λxi−1,x)QXi|Xi−1=xi−1(x) for x ∈ X
ρxi = ρ(xi−1,x) :=
{
1
Q
Xi|X
i−1=xi−1 (x)
∑
u∈U E
xi−1
x,u ρxi−1E
xi−1†
x,u if x ∈ X
ρxi−1 if x =⊥ .
for some λxi−1,x ∈ [0, δ], where QXi|Xi−1 is the channel from X¯ i−1 to X given by
QXi|Xi−1=xi−1(x) :=
∑
u∈U tr(E
xi−1
x,u ρxi−1E
xi−1†
x,u ).
Let PXn = PX1···Xn be the probability distribution of the observed outcomes after
n steps. It follows directly from the above formulas that PXn is a (δ, {QXi|Xi−1})-
source. On the other hand, if PXn is a (δ, {QXi|Xi−1)-source, then there exist weights
most trace distance δ to the original state ρ. LetM be a fixed von Neumann measurement and
let P be the distribution resulting from applying M to ρ. It is easy to see that, for any given
probability distribution P ′ which is δ-close to P , the adversary can set the device into a state
ρ′ such that a measurement M of ρ′ gives raise to the distribution P ′. Consequently, such an
adversary is at least as powerful as an adversary who can only modify the distribution of the
measurement outcomes, as proposed in our model. In particular, our impossibility results also
apply to this case.
8 This means that, even if a measurement error occurs, the state of the quantum system is not
destroyed. (Recall that our impossibility results are stronger the closer our model is to a model
describing perfect systems.)
9 Note that, unlike in the perfect case, the measurements cannot be postponed to the end of
the protocol. For example, if the user performs many measurements during the protocol, it is
very unlikely that all the outcomes are wrong, i.e., he still gets some useful information with
probability almost one. On the other hand, if the user replaces all his measurements by one
single overall measurement (at the end of the protocol) it might fail with probability δ.
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λxi−1,x ∈ [0, δ] such that the conditional probabilities are given by the above formu-
las. This reduces our “quantum” problem to a totally classical problem for an imperfect
source considerably more restrictive than an SV source (see Appendix). The corre-
sponding impossibility result is given in the next section.
4 Main technical lemma
Our main technical result can be seen as an extension of a result proved for SV sources
(cf. Lemma 3.5 of [DOPS04]). Roughly speaking, Lemma 1 below states that a task
g which requires perfect random bits can generally not be replaced by another task f
which only uses imperfect bits. Note that this impossibility is particularly interesting
for cryptography where many tasks do in fact use randomness.
More precisely, let g be an arbitrary strategy which uses imperfect randomnessXn
and, in addition, some perfect randomnessY (whose probability distribution might even
depend on the values of Xn). Let f be another strategy which only uses imperfect
randomness Xn. Furthermore, assume that, for any (δ, {QXi|Xi−1})-source PX1···Xn ,
the output distributions of the strategies g and f are (almost) identical. Then the strategy
g is (roughly) the same as f , that is, it (virtually) does not use the randomness Y .
Lemma 1. Let f be a function from X¯n to Z , g be a function from X¯n × Y to Z
and m = ⌈log2(|Z|)⌉. For any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let QXi|Xi−1 be a channel from X¯ i−1
to X , let QY |Xn be a channel from X¯n to Y , and let δ ≥ 0. Let Γ be the set of all
probability distributionsPXnY on X¯n×Y such thatPXn is a (δ, {QXi|Xi−1})-source10
and PY |Xn = QY |Xn . If, for all PXnY ∈ Γ ,
‖Pf(Xn) − Pg(Xn,Y )‖1 < ε ,
then there exists PX˜nY˜ ∈ Γ such that
Pr
(xn,y)←P
X˜nY˜
[f(xn) 6= g(xn, y)] < 5εmδ−1 ,
Proof. Assume first that the functions f and g are binary, i.e.,Z = {0, 1}. The idea is to
define two probability distributionsPV nY , PWnY ∈ Γ such that the output distributions
of the function f , f(V n) and f(Wn), are “maximally different”. Then, by assumption,
the output distributions of g(V n, Y ) and g(Wn, Y ) must be different as well. This will
then be used to conclude that the outputs of f and g are actually equal for most inputs.
In order to define the distributions PV nY and PWnY , we first consider some “in-
termediate distribution” PX˜nY˜ . It is defined as the unique probability distribution on
X¯n × Y such that PY˜ |X˜n = QY |Xn and, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and xi−1 ∈ X¯ i−1,
PX˜i|X˜i−1=xi−1(x) :=
{
(1− δ2 )QXi|Xi−1=xi−1(x) if x ∈ X
δ
2 if x =⊥ .
10 Similarly to the argument in [DOPS04], the proof can easily be extended to a statement which
holds for an even stronger type of sources, where the conditional probability distributions of
each Xi given all other source outputs, and not only the previous ones Xi−1, is contained in a
certain set Pδ .
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Note that PX˜i|X˜i−1=xi−1 ∈ P
δ(QXi|Xi−1=xi−1), i.e., PX˜n is a (δ, {QXi|Xi−1})-
source, and thus PX˜nY˜ ∈ Γ .
The distributionPV n is now defined fromPX˜n by raising the probabilities of all val-
ues11 xn ∈ f−1(0) that f maps to 0 and lowering the probabilities of all xn ∈ f−1(1).
Similarly, PWn is defined by changing the probabilities of PX˜n in the other direction.
For the formal definition, we assume without loss of generality that Pf(X˜n)(0) ≤
1
2 and
set α := Pf(X˜n)(0)/Pf(X˜n)(1), i.e., α ≤ 1. PV n and PWn are then given by
PV n(x
n) :=
{
PX˜n(x
n)(1 + τ) if xn ∈ f−1(0)
PX˜n(x
n)(1− ατ) if xn ∈ f−1(1)
PWn(x
n) :=
{
PX˜n(x
n)(1− τ) if xn ∈ f−1(0)
PX˜n(x
n)(1 + ατ) if xn ∈ f−1(1) ,
where τ := δ4 . Because∑
xn∈X¯n
PV n(x
n) =
∑
xn∈f−1(0)
PXn(x
n)(1 + τ) +
∑
xn∈f−1(1)
PXn(x
n)(1− ατ)
= Pf(Xn)(0)(1 + τ) + Pf(Xn)(1)(1− ατ) = 1 ,
PV n and, similarly, PWn , is indeed a probability distribution.
We claim that PV n and PWn are (δ, {QXi|Xi−1})-sources. To see this, note first
that, for any i ∈ {1, . . . n} and xi ∈ X¯ i, (1 − ατ)PX˜i (xi) ≤ PV i(xi) and PV i(xi) ≤
(1 + τ)PX˜i (x
i). Hence, for any x ∈ X and xi−1 ∈ X¯ i−1,
PVi|V i−1=xi−1(x) =
PViV i−1(x, x
i−1)
PV i−1(xi−1)
≥
(1− ατ)PX˜iX˜i−1(x, x
i−1)
(1 + τ)PX˜i−1 (x
i−1)
=
1− ατ
1 + τ
PX˜i|X˜i−1=xi−1(x) =
1− ατ
1 + τ
(1− δ2 )QXi|Xi−1=xi−1(x) .
Because α ≤ 1, we have PVi|V i−1=xi−1(x) ≥ (1 − δ)QXi|Xi−1=xi−1(x). Similarly,
PVi|V i−1=xi−1(x) ≤
1 + τ
1− ατ
PX˜i|X˜i−1=xi−1(x) =
1 + τ
1− ατ
(1− δ2 )QXi|Xi−1=xi−1(x)
which implies PVi|V i−1=xi−1(x) ≤ QXi|Xi−1=xi−1(x). Combining these in-
equalities, we conclude PVi|V i−1=xi−1 ∈ Pδ(QXi|Xi−1=xi−1), i.e., PV n is a
(δ, {QXi|Xi−1})-source. A similar computation shows that also the distribution PWn
is a (δ, {QXi|Xi−1})-source. Consequently, the distributions PV nY and PWnY defined
by PY |V n = QY |Xn and PY |Wn = QY |Xn , respectively, are contained in the set Γ .
Next, we will analyse the behaviour of the function g for inputs chosen accord-
ing to PV nY and PWnY , respectively, and compare it to f . For this, let qxn be the
probability that, given some fixed xn ∈ X¯n, the output of g is zero, i.e., qxn :=
11 For z ∈ {0, 1}, f−1(z) := {x ∈ X¯n : f(x) = z} denotes the preimage of z under the
mapping f .
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Pry←QY |Xn=xn [g(x
n, y) = 0]. Because PY˜ |X˜n = PY |V n = PY |Wn = QY |Xn , we
get
qxn = Pg(X˜n,Y˜ )|X˜n=xn(0) = Pg(V n,Y )|V n=xn(0) = Pg(Wn,Y )|Wn=xn(0) .
The probability that the output of f is zero for the distributions PV n and PWn can then,
obviously, be written as
Pf(V n)(0) =
∑
xn∈f−1(0)
PX˜n(x
n)(1 + τ)
Pf(Wn)(0) =
∑
xn∈f−1(0)
PX˜n(x
n)(1 − τ) .
Similarly, for g, we have
Pg(V n,Y )(0) =
∑
xn∈f−1(0)
PX˜n(x
n)(1 + τ)qxn +
∑
xn∈f−1(1)
PX˜n(x
n)(1 − ατ)qxn
Pg(Wn,Y )(0) =
∑
xn∈f−1(0)
PX˜n(x
n)(1 − τ)qxn +
∑
xn∈f−1(1)
PX˜n(x
n)(1 + ατ)qxn .
By assumption of the lemma, because, PV nY and PWnY are contained in the set Γ , the
output distributions of f and g must be close, that is, |Pf(V n)(0) − Pg(V n,Y )(0)| < ε2
and |Pf(Wn)(0) − Pg(Wn,Y )(0)| < ε2 , and hence (Pf(V n)(0) − Pg(V n,Y )(0)) −
(Pf(Wn)(0) − Pg(Wn,Y )(0)) < ε. Replacing these probabilities by the above expres-
sions leads to∑
xn∈f−1(0)
PX˜n(x
n)2τ(1 − qxn) +
∑
xn∈f−1(1)
PX˜n(x
n)2ατqxn < ε . (3)
Note that this imposes some restrictions on the possible values of qxn . Roughly speak-
ing, if f maps a certain input xn to 0, then the probability 1− qxn that g maps xn to 1
must be small. In fact, as we shall see, (3) implies a bound on the probability that the
outputs of f and g are different.
With the definition pz,w := Pf(X˜n)g(X˜n,Y )(z, w), for (z, w) ∈ {0, 1}2 and using
again the assumption of the lemma,
|p0,1 − p1,0| = |(p0,0 + p0,1)− (p0,0 + p1,0)| = |Pf(X˜n)(0)− Pg(X˜n,Y˜ )(0)| <
ε
2
,
hence,
Pr
(xn,y)←P
X˜nY
[f(xn) 6= g(xn, y)] ≤ p0,1 + p0,1 + |p1,0 − p0,1| < 2p0,1 +
ε
2
. (4)
Using (3) and the fact that the second sum is nonnegative, we get an upper bound for
p0,1, that is,
p0,1 =
∑
xn∈X¯n
PX˜n(x
n)Pf(X¯n)|X˜n=xn(0)Pg(X˜n,Y˜ )|X˜n=xn(1)
=
∑
xn∈f−1(0)
PX˜n(x
n)(1 − qxn) <
ε
2τ
=
2ε
δ
.
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Combining this with (4), we conclude Pr(xn,y)←P
X˜nY
[f(xn) 6= g(xn, y)] < 4ε
δ
+ ε2 ≤
5ε
δ
, which proves the lemma for the binary case where Z = {0, 1}.
To deduce the statement for arbitrary sets Z , consider an (injective) encoding func-
tion c which maps each element z ∈ Z to anm-tuple (c1(z), . . . , cm(z)). Since the L1-
norm ‖ · ‖1 can only decrease when applying a function, the assumption of the lemma
implies that, for all probability distributions PXnY ∈ Γ , ‖Pfk(Xn)−Pgk(Xn,Y )‖1 < ε,
where fk := ck◦f and gk := ck ◦g, for any k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. The assertion then follows
from the binary version of the lemma and the union bound. ⊓⊔
As was shown in [DOPS04], Lemma 1 implies not only impossibility of extracting
nearly perfect randomness, but also impossibility of doing almost any classical task
involving privacy (such as encryption, commitment, etc.). For illustrative purposes, we
give such an argument for extraction, referring to [DOPS04] regarding the other tasks.
Corollary 1. Let f be a function from X¯n to {0, 1} and PU be the uniform distribution
on {0, 1}. For any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let QXi|Xi−1 be a channel from X¯ i−1 to X , and let
δ ≥ 0. Then there exists a (δ, {QXi|Xi−1})-source PXn such that
‖Pf(Xn) − PU‖1 ≥
δ
10
,
Proof. Assume by contradiction that, for any (δ, {QXi|Xi−1})-source PXn , ‖Pf(Xn)−
PU‖1 <
δ
10 . Let g be the function on X
n × {0, 1} defined by g(xn, u) := u. Then,
for any probability distribution PXnU = PXn × PU , where PXn is a (δ, {QXi|Xi−1})-
source, we have ‖Pf(Xn)−Pg(Xn,U)‖1 < δ10 . Lemma 1 thus implies that there exists a
(δ, {QXi|Xi−1})-source PX˜n with Pr(xn,u)←PX˜n×PU [f(x
n) 6= g(xn, u)] < 12 , that is,
Pr(xn,u)←P
X˜n
×PU [f(x
n) 6= u] < 12 . This is a contradiction because PU is the uniform
distribution on {0, 1}. ⊓⊔
Appendix: Relation to Santha-Vazirani sources
Let PXn be a (δ, {QXi|Xi−1})-source, for some δ ≥ 0 and channels QXi|Xi−1 . It is
easy to verify that, if δ ≤ 1|X | then the entropy of the ith output Xi conditioned on
any value of the previous outputs X1, . . . , Xi−1 is lower bounded by the entropy of
QXi|Xi−1=xi−1 , i.e.,
H(Xi|X
i−1 = xi−1) = H(PXi|Xi−1=xi−1) ≥ H(QXi|Xi−1=xi−1) , (5)
for any xi−1 ∈ X¯ i−1. This holds with respect to any “reasonable” entropy measure H ,
as, for instance, the Shannon entropy, the min-entropy, or, more generally, the Re´nyi
entropy of order α, for any α ∈ [0,∞].
It is thus not surprising that (δ, {QXi|Xi−1})-sources are at least as useful as Santha-
Vazirani sources. More precisely, Lemma 2 below states that, for any α, there exist
channels QXi|Xi−1 and a deterministic12 strategy γ which allows to simulate an α-SV
source from any (δ, {QXi|Xi−1})-source, for δ = 1 − 2α. Hence, any impossibility
result for (δ, {QXi|Xi−1})-sources also holds for α-SV sources.
12 Note that any probabilistic strategy would require additional (perfect) randomness.
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Lemma 2. For any δ ≥ 0, there exist channels QXi|Xi−1 , for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and a
function γ such that the following holds: Let PXn be an arbitrary (δ, {QXi|Xi−1})-
source. Then the probability distribution PY n defined by Yi := γ(Xi), for i ∈
{1, . . . n}, is an α-SV source, for α = 1−δ2 .
Proof. Let Pδ be the binary probability distribution with Pδ(0) = 1+δ2 . For any
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let the channel QXi|Xi−1 be defined by QXi|Xi−1=xi−1 := Pδ . Ad-
ditionally, let γ be the function on {0, 1,⊥} defined by
γ(x) :=
{
x if x ∈ {0, 1}
1 if x =⊥ .
It is easy to verify that, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and xi−1 ∈ {0, 1,⊥}i−1,
Pγ(Xi)|Xi−1=xi−1(0) ≤ Pδ(0) =
1 + δ
2
= 1− α
Pγ(Xi)|Xi−1=xi−1(0) ≥ Pδ(0)(1 − δ) =
1 + δ
2
(1− δ) ≥ α ,
i.e., Pγ(Xi)|Xi−1=xi−1(0) ∈ [α, 1−α]. By convexity, it follows thatPYi|Y i−1=yi−1(0) ∈
[α, 1− α], for any yi−1 ∈ {0, 1}i−1, which concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
Note that the converse of Lemma 2 is not true, i.e., Santha-Vazirani sources
are generally weaker than (δ, {QXi|Xi−1})-sources. To see this, let, e.g., for any
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, QXi|Xi−1 be the channel defined by the uniform distribution over
X := {0, 1}, i.e.,QXi|Xi−1=xi−1(0) = 12 , for all x
i−1 ∈ X¯ i−1. It follows from (5) that
the entropy of any (δ, {QXi|Xi−1})-source PX1···Xn is at least n, for any small enough
δ ≥ 0. On the other hand, the entropy of an α-SV source PY1···Yn , for any α 6= 12 , is
generally smaller than n. As the entropy of a random variable can only decrease when
applying a (deterministic) function, the values (Y1, . . . , Yn) cannot be used to simulate
(X1, . . . , Xn).
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